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Protes ts  in  Taishi  andDongzhou:  Ci t izen engagementvs.  local  governance  
Taishi is a small village located in the Pearl River Delta,one of modern China’s most prosperous regions. It isnot economic success, however, that focused interna-
tional attention on the village, but rather an unpleasant
sequence of events in July 2005. It began when villagers filed
a lawful petition to dismiss Chen Jingshen, a local Communist
Party official who had been elected director of the village com-
mittee, stating that he had embezzled funds related to a huge
land deal. When the petition went unanswered, many of the
village residents took to the streets to express their dissatisfac-
tion. The local authorities responded on 16 August by dis-
patching around 1,000 armed riot police to disperse the peace-
fully assembled villagers, who chose not to fight back and react-
ed to the violent crackdown with total silence. After using
water hoses on the farmers and villagers, the police arrested 48
local inhabitants, including elderly women, who had signed the
petition. The crackdown brought this village of not quite 2,000
souls into the limelight of international media reporting. (1)
The villagers had the law on their side and were supported by
some “outside” individuals – lawyers, journalists, university
professors, and local people’s congress delegates from Beijing
and other parts of China. (2) The villagers’ “strategy” consisted
of bringing in the media and attorneys, acting within the limits
of the law, and showing full respect for the Communist Party’s
proclamations. However, the local government of Panyu
County, which includes Taishi Village, did not demonstrate
similar adherence to the law and Party proclamations, but
rather assumed the right to explain and interpret the law and
proclamations at their will. County officials were also able to
mobilize local media, which were completely under their con-
trol, to openly threaten the villagers, and claimed that sending
police to the village was their way of preserving “social order.”
The police also considered it appropriate to physically assault
villagers and those who came to Taishi to support them, as well
as detaining individuals without legal procedures for weeks at
a time. In short, all the violence that prevailed in Taishi was
carried out at the hands of the local government.
This scenario was repeated several months later in
Dongzhou, another small village in Guangdong Province,
with the level of official violence increasing markedly in this
case. The Dongzhou villagers claimed they had not been
appropriately compensated for farmland on which a wind-
power plant was being constructed. On 7 December 2005,
more than 1,000 villagers staged a protest, during which the
People’s Armed Police opened fire and shot to death sever-
al farmers (reports of the number killed vary), while several
dozen protestors were wounded. (3) Commentators described
the clash as “another June 4th,” referring to the Tiananmen
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1. For media reports about the Taishi protests and crackdown, see, for example, Tim Luard,
“China village democracy skin deep,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4319954.stm, published on 10 October 2005, accessed on 17 February 2006;
Tim Luard, “Conflicts mar Guangdong dream,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4620450.stm, published on 17 January 2006, accessed 17
February 2006. The chronology of the event’s development can be found online at:
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050919_1.htm, accessed 17 February 2006. 
2. One of these people involved in supporting the Taishi villagers is Ai Xiaoming, a professor of
Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. See, for example, Ai Xiaoming, “Taishi cun, wo de lingju
(Taishi Village, my neighbour),” Bingdian (Freezing Point), as included in an online collection of
articles and reports about the Taishi event: http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20051005_2.htm,
and accessed 17 February 2006. See also Edward Cody, “In Chinese uprisings, peasants find
new allies,” Washington Post, 26 November 2005; and Edward Cody, “Chinese activists tar-
geted by thug violence,” Washington Post, 1 January 2006.
3. See, for example, Edward Cody, “Police open fire on rioting farmers, fishermen in
China,” Washington Post, 8 December 2005; Howard French, “20 reported killed as
Chinese unrest escalates,” New York Times, 9 December 2005; and Mark Magnier,
“China defends police shooting of villagers,” Los Angeles Times, 11 December 2005. For
an online collection of reports and articles and a chronology of the Dongzhou event, see:
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20051209_1.htm, accessed 24 February 2006. 
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Based on the examples of protest movements that took place in the villages of Taishi and Dongzhou, the article
explores the limits of "citizen engagement" in China today.
Massacre that the Chinese government carried out against
student protestors in 1989.
Although the violent official responses to the villagers’
actions in Taishi and Dongzhou shocked the world, such
incidents are by no means exceptional in today’s China.
According to official statistics, the number of public demon-
strations in China rose from 10,000 in 1994 to 87,000 in
2005 (the year the incidents in Taishi and Dongzhou took
place), averaging about 240 per day, involving a total of
some 5 million people. (4) What official reports neglect to
mention is that the collective actions taken by ordinary citi-
zens to influence official decisions usually failed, often
because of violent crackdowns by local governments. At the
same time, the Chinese government claims it has been mak-
ing a genuine effort toward “good governance” under the
slogan of “building a harmonious society,” particularly
through the “broadening” of channels through which citi-
zens are able to participate in governmental processes for
developing policy, legislation, and regulations. (5) Also, some
observers recently found evidence of renewed implementa-
tion of political reform under Hu Jintao’s leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party.  Concepts exported from
Western democracies such as “good governance” and “citi-
zen engagement” are becoming fashionable in policy reports
and official media. Likewise, some less fashionable ideas
have also recently been revived in the form of “corporatist
governance” with Confucian ethics. The corporatisation of
politics, rooted in fascism, shares with the classical Chinese
philosophy of governance the concept of realising collective
good through political collaboration among social groups. (6)
How did all these beautiful words lead to the crackdowns in
Taishi and Dongzhou? How can one explain the govern-
ment-sanctioned violence in Taishi and Dongzhou with
these oft-repeated slogans, policies, guidelines, concepts,
and even philosophies of “good governance”? Specifically,
71N o  2 0 0 8 / 1
4. See PRC Ministry of Public Security Press page: http://www.mps.gov.cn/webpage/show
News.asp?id=1810&biaoshi=bitGreatNews; and Xinhua News Agency: http://www.xin
huanet.org/index.php?categoryid=1&p2_articleid=42&s=&, accessed 11 October,
2006.
5. See, for example, the Chinese government white paper on “Building Political Democracy
in China,” published on 19 October 2005: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.htm, accessed 14 March 2008. 
6. For an analysis of corporatist governance, see Bruce J. Dickson, “Cooptation and
Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” Political Science Quarterly, vol.
115, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), pp. 517-540.
Taishi, 2005. The local authorities dispatched around 1,000 armed riot
police to disperse the peacefully assembled villagers.
© AFP
as civic consciousness rises and engages individuals to
address local issues, does “citizen engagement” allow poor
farmers in the Chinese context to defend their lands through
protest? If the government responds to such protests with
violent crackdowns, what kind of action is appropriate for
Chinese citizens who dare to attempt to influence govern-
ment policy?
This article will not attempt to answer all these questions,
but rather will raise some further questions exploring what
happens in today’s China when citizens attempt to protect
their own rights through collective action. In particular, the
article will address how the government responds to collec-
tive public demands for improvement of governance. This
author considers such collective actions to fall into the cate-
gory of “citizen engagement,” a concept that has recently
emerged in the West to describe the participation of ordi-
nary citizens in affairs of governance through channels
beyond those provided by formal mechanisms of democracy
such as elections. (7) Such activities may, conceptually, over-
lap with the “social movements” that have long been studied
in sociology and political science, but they also possess some
new features. For example, although “citizen engagement”
may take the form of protests and other kinds of collective
actions, they usually do not have obvious ideological colour,
in contrast with the social movements born of ideology that
are particularly seen in the contemporary Chinese context.
Citizen engagement actions often focuses on a specific, con-
crete issue that troubles the everyday life of average citizens,
such as the dispute over land use for the villagers in Taishi
and Dongzhou. As these villagers mobilised their collective
strength, their aim was not confrontation with the govern-
ment but rather a  constructive interaction for the purpose of
enforcing (rather than protesting against) existing laws in
order to halt the abuse of power by particular government
officials or departments. Such protests do not challenge the
legitimacy of the state and its institutions in their role of
enlarging social interests; rather they attempt to cooperate,
collaborate, and engage with the state on both the legal and
strategic fronts to defend social interests that have been rec-
ognized by the state.
Even this kind of “citizen engagement,” however, was
answered with violence by local agencies of the Chinese
state, a fact that highlights the difficulties citizen engage-
ment often encounters in today’s China. Although incidents
of citizen engagements and their associated tragic conse-
quences typically occur as local events relating to non-politi-
cal issues, this essay suggests that the difficulties of citizen
engagement in China are intrinsically national and political
in nature. In other words, one cannot ignore the very real
political boundaries that political authoritarianism in China
has set on civic activities while applying Western concepts
such as “good governance” or “citizen engagement.” This
does not mean that China’s authoritarian political institu-
tions are unaffected by citizen engagement, or that Western
notions of democracy are not applicable to China. A realis-
tic understanding of Chinese politics and society, however,
must take into consideration fundamental institutional con-
straints on citizen activism. The unuttered assumption that
China’s globalised and marketised economy has made it
politically indistinguishable from a democracy, or at least
from a country in the process of democratisation, is mislead-
ing.
This essay will first analyse the local interaction between cit-
izens, their collective actions for engaging in governance,
and the local government’s responses to citizens’ engage-
ment, with the goal of assessing the politics of local govern-
mental-citizen confrontation. It will then examine the trian-
gular relationship between citizens, local government, and
the central leadership, and discuss the options of the author-
itarian state in this relationship. The concluding section will
be devoted to some basic observations concerning the place
of political authoritarianism in understanding the politics of
social progress in China.Local  governmental  r esi stanceto c it izen engagement:  Thepi tfa ll  of  development
By their nature, citizen engagement and collaborative gover-
nance are concerned with local public affairs, or at least are
conducted locally even though they may deal with issues that
have implications beyond the local area. More concisely, all
public issues, whether global or national, take on a local
focus when residents rise up to voice their concerns and take
action through public channels to deal with the issues. (8)
Local government thus plays a vital role in the process. In
China, however, as evidenced in the cases of Taishi and
7. For the concept and practice of “citizen engagement,” see, for example, Katherine A.
Graham and Susan D. Phillips (eds.), Citizen Engagement: Lessons in Participation from
Local Government, Toronto, Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1998; Cliff
Zukin, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins, and Michael X Delli Carpin, A New
Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen, New
York, Oxford University Press, 2006. Also, Larry N. Gerston, Public Policymaking in a
Democratic Society: A Guide to Civic Engagement, Armonk, New York, M. E. Sharpe,
2002; William J. Doherty, Professionals as Citizens: Civic Engagement Skills for
Practitioners, London, Routledge, 2006.
8. Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips, “Making Public Participation More Effective:
Issues for Local Government,” in Graham and Phillips, Citizen Engagement, op. cit.
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Dongzhou, local government is more often the major obsta-
cle to citizen engagement in public affairs. One has to com-
prehend this in order to understand the politics of gover-
nance in today’s China.
Local Communist Party cadres and officials have many rea-
sons for taking a negative attitude toward citizens’ actions.
The most powerful imperative, and perhaps also the most
justifiable in the context of China, is their overwhelming
concern for economic development. Previously measured by
GDP growth and now measured with a slightly more sophis-
ticated system of “governance performance,” economic
development is still the backbone of the system. This imper-
ative is justifiable (1) because economic development has
been the “central task” of the Party and state since the post-
Mao era began in 1978, and (2) because the current lead-
ership, despite its initiative of “scientific perspective of
development” that seeks a balance between economic
growth and social development, puts equal emphasis on
“concentrating on construction and wholeheartedly promot-
ing development.” As Hu Jintao has repeatedly emphasized,
“the essence of scientific development is development.” (9) It
is therefore politically correct for Party committees and gov-
ernmental authorities at various levels to do whatever is nec-
essary to stimulate local economic development, although
they are expected to hold social discontent on a tight leash.
This “developmental mentality” is ironically the root of
many disputes between local officials and citizens, including
the land use issues that caused the mass protests in Taishi
and Dongzhou. Indeed, in both of those cases local Party
and government officials defended their violent response by
arguing that the villagers’ collective action would scare away
foreign investors, (10) implying that the protests had to be
promptly suppressed in order to guarantee effective imple-
mentation of the government’s “central task.”
The incentive to be “wholeheartedly” engaged in “develop-
ment” rather than in citizen-oriented governance is powerful
not only because of its prominence in official programs.
Momentum has also developed from the personal and pro-
fessional benefit that individual cadres accrue from develop-
ment-related activities such as foreign investment and high-
speed growth. Local economic performance can be an
important factor in the career development of local officials,
while the effect of local residents’ assessment of official per-
9. The latest elaboration by Hu on this point can be found in his speeches to delegates to
the 11th National People’s Congress, held in March 2008: http://news.xinhuanet.com/
misc/2008-03/08/content_7746961.htm, accessed 14 March 2008.
10. See notes 1, 2, and 3.
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Taishi, July 31, 2005. Villagers protest against corruption 
of local officials.
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formance is negligible. Even for officials and cadres who
lack driving professional ambition, measures that promote
economic development can bring tremendous personal ben-
efit in the form of salaries and incomes that increase in line
with the improved economic performance of their localities.
They enjoy better benefits, they build majestic homes with
taxpayer funds and then legally assign the houses to them-
selves and their families, they upgrade their automobiles
through the government budget, and they enjoy frequent
opportunities to travel abroad, attend banquets, and partici-
pate in other forms of entertainment, all at the public
expense. (11) Moreover, the potential for illicit profit expands
when the local economy prospers. Construction projects
enable local cadres to shave a significant share of the budg-
et, public or private, into their own pockets. Creating local
investment also provides opportunities to take bribes – for
example, cadres’ children are more likely to become the
chairmen or CEOs of companies jointly sponsored by over-
seas investors and local governments. Economic prosperity
is, therefore, not only a major source of political legitimacy
for China’s Communist regime, as many have noted; it is
also the main ore deposit that individual officials and cadres
can mine, legally or illegally, for their personal enrichment.
The entrepreneurial nature of the Chinese state (12) pertains
not only to its developmental function, but also to the entre-
preneurial behaviour of local governmental cadres who prof-
it personally from their public power.
This entrepreneurial spirit is not the sole motivating force of
the Chinese state and its local agents. The state is fully
aware of its political functions beyond profit-making and
safeguarding profit-making. The primary political condition
for economic development is unfaltering social stability, nar-
rowly defined as a social situation without mass protests or
any event that publicly air social conflicts or question govern-
ment legitimacy. If such an event occurs and gains momen-
tum, as in the case of Taishi and Dongzhou, the local
authorities are usually reluctant to respond with administra-
tive improvements, which would indicate that there must
11. For evidence and discussion on this point, see Guoguang Wu, “Social Tension and
Political Adaptation under Globalization,” in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne (eds.),
Socialist China, Capitalist China: Social Tension and Political transition under Economic
Globalization, London, Routledge, forthcoming.
12. For the concept of the entrepreneurial state in China under reform, see, for instance,
Marc Blecher, “Development State, Entrepreneur State: The Political Economy of
Socialist Reform in Xinju Municipality in Guanghan County,” in Gordon White (ed.), The
Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to a Crisis, London, Macmillan,
1991; Shawn Shih-hung Shieh, The Entrepreneurial State: Local Governments, Property
Rights, and China’s Transition from State Socialism, 1978-1990, a Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, 1996; and Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real
Estate and Commerce Department in Reform Era Tianjin, London, Routledge, 1998. 
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have been some wrongdoing or malfunction in local gover-
nance, that someone among the local authorities should take
the blame, and that the citizens’ grievance was justified to
some degree. Blaming colleagues or subordinates often
results in local leaders undermining their own powerbases,
which are rooted in the Party-state political hierarchy rather
than in popular elections. Attributing any merit to the
protests would also provide incentive for local residents to
repeat collective action in the future when they are discon-
tent — an obvious political danger that local authorities are
bound to make every effort to avoid. 
The one stone that can kill two birds, i.e., protecting local
networks among cadres and reducing further potential for
social unrest, is to politicise local conflicts and their resulting
unrest by attributing protests to enemies of the state, or “hos-
tile forces” in China’s current parlance. In this way the
actions of the citizens, however moderate their demands, are
interpreted as criminal rather than constructive, and as a
political plot engendering social tension rather than a civic
effort engaging citizens to improve governance. Where such
a trouble occurs, the local government is authorised to carry
out a crackdown, and this crackdown in turn serves to
demonstrate the local officials’ ardent commitment to, and
effective implementation of, Party policies. In fact, the cen-
tral Party-state has for years emphasised the requirement of
“shoutu youze,” literally meaning that local cadres are “duty-
bound to defend the territories of their jurisdictions” in
terms implying that the regime is at war against invaders in
its efforts to maintain social stability. Consequently, the
Party-state tends to reward rather than punish local officials
who suppress the emergence of social discontent. 
This doesn’t mean that all local leaders follow this option.
Some may personally and politically prefer to negotiate with
citizens who use collective actions to settling disputes, and
some even like to listen to the voice of protesters to improve
their governance. But such cases are extremely rare. Both
the logic described above and the historical record since
1989 powerfully demonstrate that positive, moderate, and
constructive ways of dealing with social protests and other
forms of citizen action often result in increased political risk,
if not political suicide, for governmental officials in terms of
individual careers and group unity. (13) Without a democratic
political framework, local Chinese officials are not account-
able to the citizens under their governance, but rather to the
higher authorities and to their subordinates within the Party-
state power hierarchy, right down to the grassroots level of
village heads. (14) Officials of course have nothing to gain by
intentionally irritating villagers, but whenever problems in
governance arise — and this usually involves disputes
between citizens and local governmental officials and/or
their grassroots agents — they are presented with the choice
of supporting the citizens, from which they gain nothing but
more potential for trouble, or victimising the citizens, and
thereby protecting what they have and potentially gaining
more.
The pol it ics  o f  def ining a poli t ica lboundary:  The  national-local- ci t izentriangle
This chain of non-democratic accountability within the
Chinese political hierarchy also helps explain why the
national leadership doesn’t intervene in cases such as Taishi
and Dongzhou to reinforce the law, justice, and village
autonomy, even though public opinion anticipated such
interventions immediately after the crackdowns occurred in
Guangdong. Special interest groups have managed to secure
local power bases within business communities and bureau-
cracies with little restriction since the 1990s, at considerable
cost to the public interest. The national leadership is not usu-
ally bound to these interest groups, and if their activities con-
flict with the government’s image among citizens and, in par-
ticular, China’s international reputation as a whole, national
leaders may on occasion sacrifice some local cadres for gen-
eral political and policy considerations. This motivation,
however, cannot be overestimated, because the Chinese
national leaders, like their counterparts at the local level,
conduct their statecraft within a non-democratic institutional
framework. This means that their legitimacy and powerbas-
es are not rooted in popular support, but rather among their
subordinates, especially local authorities, on whom they rely
to sustain their positions of power and to implement their
policies. (15)
In the triangular relationship between national leaders, local
governmental officials, and ordinary citizens, the national
leaders have the most discretion in making political deci-
sions, but not to the degree that they are able to arbitrarily
13. A prime example is the differing opinions of national leaders on how to deal with the
Falun Gong protest in Zhongnanhai in 1999; Zhu Rongji was reported to hold a moder-
ate attitude while Jiang Zemin insisted on imposing a crackdown, with the result that
Jiang apparently gained the upper hand at the cost of Zhu’s position being undermined. 
14. Susan Shirk notices a similar logic of “bottom-up” constraints in authoritarian Chinese
politics, although in a different historical context. See Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic
of Economic Reform in China, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, particular-
ly Chapter 1.
15. For the importance of local implementation in China’s policy process, see, for example,
Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision
Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992.
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victimise local governmental officials. Local cadres do all the
dirty work for the national regime in areas such as coercive
family planning and stimulating economic development at
the cost of social justice and environment, and can hardly be
expected to tolerate being made the scapegoats of  high-
minded and hypocritical policy concepts such as “people-ori-
ented” policies and “harmonious society.” If discontent in
the grassroots bureaucracy should build up to a level where
it could become part of a power struggle in Beijing, it could
potentially disrupt or even destroy the career of a national
leader. For this reason, while the national leadership occa-
sionally throws its weight behind ordinary citizens as a
reminder to local emperors that they cannot abuse their
power too much, it will more reliably cast its lot with local
officials for the mutual benefit of their legitimacy, policy
interests, and political careers. In particular, the individual
leaders of today’s Chinese Party-state do not enjoy the
unquestioned legitimacy of their revolutionary predecessors;
they need to make more effort to gain the loyalty in their
ranks that, for an authoritarian regime, is much more impor-
tant than social justice at the local level.
As the Taishi event was unfolding, Premier Wen Jiabao, a
leader with a good reputation for defending ordinary peo-
ple’s interests, visited the Guangdong region, and was wide-
ly expected to say a word or two criticising local cadres who
were violating the procedures of village democracy. (16) Wen
maintained a complete and noticeable silence, however; he
even went so far as to tell the visiting British Prime Minister
Tony Blair and EU leaders around that time that village
democracy was being genuinely carried out in China, and
that this democratic training would lay down a foundation for
the participation of farmers in higher-level elections. (17)
Wen’s popularity arose in part from his claim that he access-
es websites everyday by himself (rather than through secre-
taries) in order to learn the views of ordinary people, so he
should have had many channels of information about the
events in Taishi, not only from domestic websites boiling
with condemnation of local governmental violence, but also
from headline stories in the Hong Kong newspapers to
which Chinese leaders enjoy privileged access. Indeed,
given the proximity of Guangdong Province to Hong Kong,
national leaders invariably pay special attention to the Hong
Kong media when visiting Guangdong.
Wen Jiabao’s silence could not have come as a surprise,
however, to close observers of his political circumstances and
Chinese politics in general. The Communist Party Central
Committee had scheduled its annual plenary meeting soon
after Wen’s Guangdong trip, and the central agenda item
was a resolution on the next five-year plan of national eco-
nomic development. (18) As the primary administrator of
China’s booming economy, Wen needed the support of this
decision-making body and its more than 300 members,
which includes all major cadres of provincial-level units.
Under the chain of authoritarian political accountability,
cadres of the Panyu County government had an interest in
supporting the village head of Taishi who was being accused
of corruption by villagers; Guangdong provincial leaders had
an obligation to protect Panyu bureaucrats from attacks by
negative public opinion; and the national leaders, including
Wen Jiabao, for all his assumed support for lawful civic
action to improve local governance, depended on
Guangdong’s provincial leaders to consolidate their person-
al powerbases and implement their policies of economic
development and social stability. While provincial leaders
might be even more dependent on the central leadership for
advancing their careers, the increasingly decentralized sys-
tem embedded in decades of economic reform has tilted the
politics between the national centre and the localities more
in the direction of reducing central autonomy.
The local governmental strategy of politicising local conflicts
adds another heavy-weight factor to this balancing game
between politics and governance, between local power and
national policy, and between authoritarian accountability and
popular legitimacy. This politicisation easily transforms the
regime’s concern for social stability to an overwhelming obses-
sion with the security of the regime and the state that lends
ideological and international significance to local issues. As
international media tried to cover the Taishi and Dongzhou
protests, their professional ethics were attributed to “foreign
hostile forces.” When lawyers, professors, and other civil
rights activists from Guangzhou, Beijing, and other parts of
China made efforts to assist the Taishi and Dongzhou farm-
ers, they were labelled “political dissidents” who were chal-
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16. Wen inspected Guangdong in 9-13 September 2005, as reported by official Chinese
media: http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/zygz/wen2005/, accessed 14 March
2008. 
17. See Wen’s September 2005 conversations with European leaders, including UK Prime
Minister Blair and European Union Commissioner Barroso, in which Wen emphasized
grassroots democracy, at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-09/05/con-
tent_3447958.htm, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-09/06/content_34
50485.htm, and http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8133.asp, accessed 14
March 2008. Weeks later when Wen met a French journalist, he repeated the points
about Chinese democracy and political reform. See: http://ln.dzw.gov.cn/show_
doc.asp?id=1992, accessed 14 March 2008.
18. The CCP held its 5th Plenum of the 16th Central Committee on 8-11 October 2005. The
Plenum passed the central leadership’s recommendations regarding the 11th Five-Year
Plan, a significant document in guiding China’s economic development. See:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-10/11/content_3606215.htm, accessed 14
March 2008.
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lenging the legitimacy of the regime. This politicisation justi-
fied the local crackdowns as a defence against a political con-
spiracy to “overthrow” the government, and was inevitably
endorsed, rather than punished, by the central government.
Globalisation has expanded the international networks of
China’s citizen engagement, at least in terms of sharing
information. The movements in Taishi and Dongzhou were
no exception, even though they were more remote political-
ly, and in the case of Dongzhou, also geographically. While
this international element can help local citizens, it also pro-
vides local bureaucrats with an excuse to take action against
citizen engagement in the name of defending “state sover-
eignty.” This is especially effective in attracting national
leaders’ vigilance in defending Chinese political institutions,
and appeals to a popular resurgence of nationalism. Yes, the
Chinese government welcomes foreign funds and assistance
in promoting gender equality, environment protection, and
poverty relief. But there is a pitfall. As long as the govern-
ment itself is involved (and especially if it is the dominant
force), such Chinese-foreign collaborations are generally
politically safe (apart from a few cases in which internal fac-
tional, departmental, and political conflicts have led to some
such collaborative programs being labelled “foreign spy pro-
grams”). But the situation can be extremely difficult when it
is civil society organisations that are receiving foreign funds
and assistance. (19) For example, activists from Chinese
AIDS organisations have been detained by the Chinese
police and charged with releasing “state secrets” that were
in fact merely statistics on China’s AIDS problems.
Collaborations require information sharing, but the Chinese
government can arbitrarily classify any information flowing
out of China as a “state secret.” 
This touches on the legal dimension of citizen engagement
and collaborative governance. Needless to say, China has
achieved some progress towards the rule of law, which has
helped enlarge the space for citizen engagement. Any
progress inevitably encounters political barriers, however, if
legal procedures challenge, or have the potential to chal-
lenge, the political considerations of the regime as a whole
or of certain national leaders at any given moment. The
power to define such “challenges” rests in the hands of polit-
ical leaders, rather than in laws and legal procedures. In
other words, the Communist Party and state leaders have
the discretion to find enemies among citizens, to locate “for-
eign hostile forces” behind international collaborations, and
to determine the impropriety of existing Chinese law in set-
tling governance problems. Politics may no longer dominate
daily life in China, but when it does intervene in daily life,
through the acts of either the central or local authorities, the
legal system can provide little defence against it, as seen in
the cases of Taishi and Dongzhou. In other words, it is pol-
itics rather than any other element that determines whether
laws and the legal system serve merely as convenient tools of
governance, and whether political considerations vastly over-
whelm even the best intentions of national leaders and legal
and political institutions. The boundary between what is
regarded as citizen engagement to improve governance and
what is construed as “hostile actions” undermining the cur-
rent regime is therefore arbitrarily determined by authoritar-
ian politics rather than by the intentions of the citizens
engaged in a collective action; likewise arbitrary is the
boundary dividing ”citizen engagement” from confrontation
with the government.Back to  the  basic s,  back  to  thequestions :  Conclus ions
It is obvious that citizen engagement in China can be effec-
tive if it doesn’t question public authorities; but it always
meets tremendous problems when touching political bound-
aries set by the state, either national, local, or both. This
reveals a series of dilemmas that arise from efforts to
improve local governance and citizen participation in these
efforts. Boundaries dividing politics from other aspects of life
are often described as a sign of progress in China’s reforms,
given that totalitarian autocracy kept politics at the forefront
of everything. (20) It is true that only through such boundaries
can civil society emerge in the spheres beyond state control,
and citizen engagement can develop on politically “soft”
issues that are directly relevant to people’s daily lives. (21) But
these boundaries are not always easy to draw; many prob-
lems of local governance are rooted to a greater or lesser
extent in the shortcomings and malfunctions of local political
institutions and the personnel responsible for them, and cit-
izen engagement that aims to improve local governance is
therefore often at odds with the interests of local Party-gov-
ernmental authorities.
Existing political boundaries are uncertain and shifting. In
the positive sense they are moving to allow more space for
citizens’ freedoms. For a pessimist, however, the shifting
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boundaries mean that citizens can never be sure of the bot-
tom line that the state draws for their engagement, a bottom
line that the state is not reluctant to take coercive, violent
action to defend. The cases of Taishi and Dongzhou clearly
reflect the problem: the local authorities decided that legal
actions were illegal, and crackdowns followed. The collective
movements did not question governmental authority, but still
encountered political boundaries that shifted to contain their
activity. Similarly, when ordinary Chinese citizens engage to
fight against a spreading epidemic, gender inequality, gov-
ernmental corruption, improper land use, environmental pol-
lutions, or other such issues, they believe they are helping
the government at the same time as they are helping them-
selves, but powerful figures within the government may beg
to differ. The nature of their engagement, and even of their
lives, can be suddenly and arbitrarily interpreted as some-
thing completely different by those who are empowered to
define the intention and implications of every action. 
The conclusion is therefore quite plain: regime type matters
for citizen engagement. Just as democracy provides a basic
political environment for collaborative governance through
citizen engagement, political boundaries set by non-demo-
cratic institutions often become barriers to citizen engage-
ment and collaborative governance, as in the case of China.
Of course formal, procedural democracy is insufficient for
citizen participation and good governance, and that is why
various forms of substantive participation under the concept
of citizen engagement and collaborative governance have
emerged in the West. However, this does not deny the util-
ity of the formal democratic political framework in providing
a minimal foundation for progress in citizen-oriented gover-
nance. Lacking such a framework, China’s citizen engage-
ment remains subject to non-democratic constraints imposed
on governance improvement. Even top-down accountability
takes on a negative logic, as national leaders feel constrained
from supporting citizens’ actions deemed “hostile” by local
authorities. The limited “reach of the state,” in the term pro-
posed years ago by Shue to discuss state-society relations in
China, (22) in this case becomes detrimental to social activity
in the triangular relationship between central-local-social
interaction, just as an omni-present state inevitably decreas-
es social autonomy. This institutional framework produces a
political environment in which beautiful promises can be
made at the national level while boundless disillusion domi-
nates local practice. The official doctrine of “harmonious
society” therefore prevents bottom-up efforts to resolve the
problems that disrupt social harmony.
As mentioned at the beginning, this essay is designed to
raise more questions than answers regarding Chinese citi-
zens’ efforts to influence public affairs, a trend arising from
expanding space for social activity under limited liberalisa-
tion and the increasing pitfalls of economic development
under political authoritarianism. At this point in the discus-
sion, we are left with many questions: How can citizen
engagement be possible without a participatory political
framework? What difference does the absence of democra-
cy make for citizen engagement in authoritarian China? Can
“collaborative governance” mean collaboration between the
state and some state-selected social groups while rejecting
other social groups? Who can legitimately decide this selec-
tion? When citizen engagement involves elements of civil
disobedience, can it still be considered “collaborative gover-
nance”? Can concepts that are rooted in Western democrat-
ic societies, such as “citizen engagement,” “collaborative
governance,” and “good governance,” be applied the same
way in an authoritarian state?
Taishi literally means “great rock,” and Dongzhou “eastern
islet.” When political boundaries spring up like “great rocks”
before citizens on their way to improving Chinese gover-
nance, China seems more like an “eastern islet” in the dem-
ocratic world than a country embracing political, social, and
cultural (rather than economic) globalisation. Of course cit-
izen engagement can be a way to push democratization for-
ward, rather than simply surrendering to the constraints of
non-democracy. But that is another story, given how the
Chinese state arbitrarily detects a democratic pulse even in
apolitical citizen engagement. •
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Glossary
Chen Jingshen 陳景深
Dongzhou 東洲
hexie shehui 和諧社會
kexue fazhan guan 科學發展觀
kexue fazhan guan, 科學發展觀，
diyi yaoyi shi fazhan 第一要義是發展
Panyu 番禺
shoutu youze 守土有責
Taishi 太石
yi ren wei ben 以人為本
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